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Dominique Ladomato*
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's society, the traditional family unit of mother-father-child is
less common,' due in part to advances in reproductive technology 2 and
legal reform. 3 This makes room for modem family units where parents are
not genetically related to their children.4 Whereas adoption was once the
only alternative that allowed infertile individuals to become parents,
scientific advancements now allow individuals to utilize surrogacy in order
to become parents.5 This has created confusion with regard to legal
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1. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 880 (1984) (arguing that the landscape of the traditional family is evolving away from
the nuclear unit).
2. See Liz Mandarano, In the Age of Alternative Reproduction, Who Are a Child's
Parents? HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 29, 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/liz-
mandarano/alternative-reproduction-parents b_807898.html.
3. Id. See also Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 189 (2011) (explaining the extensive history of American family law in the
twentieth century); cf Carlyn Kolker & Patricia Hurtado, Divorce Easier as New York Law
Ends Need to Lie, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2010, 6:48 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2010-08-16/breaking-up-not-so-hard-to-do-as-new-york-s-divorce-law-ends-need
-to-lie.html (explaining that New York became the last state in the United States to allow
no-fault divorce, making divorce easier for couples); Rachel La Corte, Washington Gov
Signs Gay Marriage Bill Into Law, ABC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/OTUS/wireStory/washington-state-governor-signs-gay-marriage-
bill-law-15575929 (stating that Washington is the seventh state to legalize gay marriage in
the United States).
4. For background information on the reproductive revolution of American society and
assisted reproductive technologies in our world today, generally see LIZA MUNDY,
EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: HOW THE SCIENCE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS CHANGING
OUR WORLD (2007).
5. For an examination of why some women turn to surrogacy, see ZARA GRISWOLD,
SURROGACY WAS THE WAY: TWENTY INTENDED MOTHERS TELL THEIR STORIES (2005).
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definitions of what constitutes a parent and who has parental rights.6
Because of these advancements, legal reform in this field has been
necessary. Surrogacy contracts are now recognized and enforceable in
certain states,7 however, there is still no uniform regulation of traditional
surrogacy for-pay contracts.
The majority of arguments against allowing traditional surrogacy for-
pay contracts to be contractually enforceable are moralistic: likening
surrogacy to prostitution,8 slavery,9 or "baby selling."' 0  On the contrary,
the arguments for allowing enforceable traditional surrogacy for-pay
contracts tend to be unrealistic and overly simplistic: women have the
absolute right to do what they want with their bodies," women should have
equal rights to contract for services,12 or women should be allowed to
altruistically assist those who want to utilize surrogacy.
6. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Considering Mom, Maternity and the Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 601
(2009) (offering an in depth analysis of what constitutes motherhood). See generally Helene
S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Disharmony on a Decisive Social Issue, 100
Nw. U. L. REv. 465, 474 (2006) (recognizing the confusion of determining parenthood in
surrogacy because "[s]urrogacy involves a minimum of three people."). See Charles P.
Kindregan, Jr., Considering Mom, Maternity and the Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 601 (2009) (offering an in
depth analysis of what constitutes motherhood).
7. See discussion infra Part It.
8. See Jean M. Sera, Surrogacy and Prostitution: A Comparative Analysis, 5 AM. U.J.
GENDER & L. 315, 317-23 (1997). See also N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 122 note (McKinney
2010) (Practice Commentaries) ("In addition, commercial surrogacy arrangements involve a
form of procreation for profit, if not prostitution.").
9. See Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conception: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65
N.C. L. REV. 127, 144 (1986) ("The closest historical antecedent to the commodification of
humanity-slavery in this nation only one hundred and twenty-five years ago-should
present some resistance to returning to a practice of legally sanctioned trafficking in lives.").
10. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (invalidating a traditional
surrogacy arrangement as contrary to public policy).
11. This argument is easily criticized since the Supreme Court has ruled there is no
absolute constitutional right to privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("The
privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute."); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (limiting the holding that privacy right to engage in adult
consensual sexual conduct to cases not involving "minors, persons who might be injured or
coerced, those who might not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or prostitution.").
12. Furthermore, female autonomy is not the most convincing argument in this arena
because the surrogate mother is not the only person who has an interest at stake when a
child is also involved. But see Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract:
The Erosion of Female Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 717, 727-
28 (2003) (providing the feminist reaction to how protectionism infringes on a woman's
right to freely contract).
13. Altruism implies that a surrogate mother has the child's interest in mind at the time of
contracting. See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby
M, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 67, 77, 93 (2007) (arguing "there is, you might say, a market
for altruism" since providing infertile couples with parenthood opportunities also acts in
concert with a monetary fee as a form of compensation. Furthermore, "the role of altruism
in this decision to act as a surrogate seems undeniable.").
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In this Note, I will argue that payment contracts for alternative
reproduction, in the form of traditional surrogacy, should not only be
recognized by all states, but that contract regulation by the federal
government is necessary. This is especially important with regard to
payment between private parties, to prevent discriminatory results,
unconscionable and coercive contracts, and to open up assisted
reproductive technologies to a wider selection of people, such as gay men,
lesbians, and fertile couples.
Throughout this Note, I will focus on individual private parties entering
into these traditional surrogacy for-pay contracts and their vulnerabilities in
one-on-one contracting between a female surrogate and future parent(s)
when there is a lack of governmental regulation in this field of law. In Part
II, I will examine traditional surrogacy for-pay contracts and survey how
the different states deal with payment for traditional surrogacy services,
some of which ban payment altogether and others which do not regulate
payment at all. In Part III, I will examine why banning payment creates
discriminatory and unwanted results, and how it ignores the unique nature
of assisted reproductive technologies. In Part IV, I will suggest a payment
schedule and other mandatory limitations on these contracts that will
protect the surrogate, as well as the parents and future child. Finally, I will
conclude that the decriminalization of altruistic traditional surrogacy does
not go far enough with regard to legal surrogacy regulation.
II. TRADITIONAL SURROGACY: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
TO CONTRACTING
There are two basic types of surrogacy available today: traditional and
gestational.14 In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate mother is genetically
related to the child by contributing her genetic material to the child.15 In
other words, she is the genetic mother of the child.16 Therefore, traditional
surrogacy is similar to adoption, and indeed the intended parents may have
to legally adopt the child after birth.' 7 Gestational surrogacy, on the other
hand, allows a surrogate to carry a fertilized egg, to which she is not
genetically related, to full term.' 8 The egg and sperm can either come from
14. See Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics,
Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 Am. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 379, 383 (2007).
15. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1222 (1994).
16. Id. ("In traditional surrogacy the so-called 'surrogate' mother is not only the woman
who gave birth to the child, but the child's genetic mother as well. She is, without a doubt,
the 'natural' parent of the child").
17. See Am. Bar Ass'n, What is Surrogacy?, FINDLAw, http://public.findlaw.
com/abaflg/flg-17-4a-7.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
18. See Alayna Ohs, The Power of Pregnancy: Examining Constitutional Rights in a
Gestational Surrogacy Contract, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 339, 340 (2002) ("Where courts
or legislatures have allowed gestational surrogacy contracts, however, surrogates have often
been seen as providers of a 'service,' rather than baby-sellers."). One of the differences
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the intended mother and fatherl 9 of the future child or from an egg and
20
sperm donor. In either case, the gestational surrogate mother has no
genetic claim on the child.2 1
This Note will focus on traditional surrogacy because it is a unique
practice that highlights the need for payment and contract regulation. First,
an enforceable traditional surrogacy contract requires a surrogate to give up
a legally recognizable parenthood right. If this aspect of the traditional
surrogacy were not contractually enforceable, however, it would defeat the
purpose of the relationship altogether. In other words, intended parents
who are unwilling or unable to contribute their own genetic material to the
fetus could be forced to endure complicated family structures, whereby the
surrogate mother maintains legal rights even after contractually agreeing to
terminate them. Second, traditional surrogacy can be a safer and more
effective alternative for infertile individuals to utilize, as opposed to
gestational surrogacy which requires more invasive medical procedures. 2 2
Third, traditional surrogacy is simpler, less expensive, and faster to
implement than other alternatives.23 While some might argue the
simplicity of traditional surrogacy contracts is a reason to prevent
between these two types of surrogacy is how they are perceived by society. With traditional
surrogacy, it is much easier to call the surrogate the "mother" of the child because she is
genetically related to it. This is not the case with gestational surrogacy.
19. The term "intended" to describe a parent or parents is used in surrogacy. The
intended parent is the one who initiated surrogacy, but is not necessarily genetically related
to the child. See Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.4th 84, 93 (1993) ("They affirmatively intended
the birth of the child, and took the steps necessary to effect in vitro fertilization. But for their
acted-on intention, the child would not exist.").
20. E.g., Robin Hilborn, What Is Gestational Surrogacy?, FAMILY HELPER (May 7,
2011), http://www.familyhelper.net/iy/surrogacy/definition.html; Heather Weller,
Traditional Versus Gestational Surrogacy, CHILDBIRTH SOLUTIONS (Mar. 30, 2001),
http://childbirthsolutions.com/articles/traditional-versus-gestational-surrogacy/.
21. Hilborn, supra note 20. See also Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.4th at 87 (holding that a
gestational surrogate had no legal parental rights to the child born to her).
22. Weller, supra note 20 (explaining the process of in vitro fertilization (IVF) requires
weeks of medical intervention for the surrogate); Magdalina Gugucheva, Surrogacy in
America, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS (2010), http://www.councilfor
responsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevejOalm.pdf (stating that IVF used in
gestational surrogacy is generally more invasive than artificial insemination used in
traditional surrogacy); Debra Morgenstern Katz, Womb for Rent, PARENTING,
http://www.parenting.com/article/womb-for-rent (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
23. The time it takes for the traditional surrogate to be inseminated with the chosen sperm
and to get pregnant can be very short. However, many people must wait years in order to
complete the adoption process. See How Long Does an Adoption Take, ADOPTION.ORG,
http://www.adoption.org/adopt/how-long-does-an-adoption-take.php (last visited Feb. 16,
2012). Gestational surrogacy, which is a medically complicated procedure, can be time
consuming as well. See Katz, supra note 22 (discussing gestational surrogacy: "Once tests
determine that the surrogate is capable of carrying a pregnancy to term and that the intended
mother's eggs are of good quality (the father's sperm is also analyzed), the women are put
on medication to get their cycles in sync. Typically, this means six weeks' worth of daily
hormone injections for the surrogate and three weeks of daily hormone injections to
stimulate egg production for the mother.").
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contractual enforcement in this area, I argue that this simplistic nature is
relevant because it creates an alternative for those who do not necessarily
want a genetic child but cannot easily utilize adoption.24 Fourth, traditional
surrogacy forces society to reexamine and question preconceived
definitions of "parent" or "parenthood." 2 5  Finally, to deny contractual
enforcement of traditional surrogacy makes the assumption that a woman
cannot and would not willingly make the informed decision to give her
child to another. While there are clearly cases which illustrate this point,26
there are also many traditional surrogates who have never changed their
minds about giving up a genetically related child.27
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES A TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACT?
28
In a traditional surrogacy contract, a surrogate agrees to not only
carry a biological child to term for another couple, but also agrees to
terminate her legal rights to the child at birth.2 9 This is distinct from a
gestational contract which may not require the surrogate to surrender
anything other than custody of the child. If a state in which a contract is
formed does not have a clear legal rule on the enforceability of surrogacy
24. See Susan Donaldson James, More Gay Men Choose Surrogacy to Have Children,
ABC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/OnCall/
story?id-4439567&page=1 (explaining that adoption is not always a feasible option for gay
couples because more than half of U.S. adoptions are within families and other countries
may have discriminatory restrictions); see also Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and
Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 21, 22 (1989) (explaining the growing popularity of surrogacy is due, in part, to the
"shortage of babies for adoption" fitting a specific, desirable demographic which are in high
demand).
25. To determine this, several tests have been used in the past, including but not limited
to an intent test, a genetic test, a gestation test, or a best interests test. For an analysis of
these, see Christen Blackburn, Family Law - Who Is a Mother? Determining Legal
Maternity in Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 349, 353-64
(2009).
26. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236-38, 1259 (traditional surrogate mother
allegedly threatened suicide if she did not get the baby back, but the court awarded custody
to the biological father because it was in the best interest of the child).
27. See BRETTE MCWHORTER SEMBER, THE COMPLETE ADOPTION & FERTILITY LEGAL
GUIDE, 205 (2004) ("In most cases, a surrogate does not change her mind, especially when
you use a respected surrogacy program that will carefully screen all potential surrogates and
help you find a good match.").
28. For a sample traditional surrogacy contract available online, see Sample TS Contract:
For TS via AI or IVF, Single Intended Father, ALLABOUTSURROGACY.COM, http://www.
allaboutsurrogacy.com/sample-contracts/TScontract2.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) ("The
parties understand that Surrogate parenting exists in an unsettled, little established area of
the law, therefore, no warranties can be made or have been made as to the outcome of
judicial proceedings which could result from the conduct contemplated within this
Agreement.").
29. See Sample TS Contract, ALLABOUTSURROGACY.COM, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.
com/sample contracts/TScontractl.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) ("Surrogate and
Husband desire and intend that any Child born pursuant to this Agreement shall be morally,
ethically, legally, contractually and otherwise the Child of the Intended Parents for all
purposes.
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contracts, surrogate arrangements face uncertainty from the outset.30 There
is no clear example of statutory language recognizing the enforceability of
traditional surrogacy because no state has expressly permitted traditional
surrogacy contracts.
Traditional surrogacy contracts are particularly problematic because
they elicit a concept most people are uncomfortable with: that human
beings are commodities.3 2 Indeed, the most famous case involving a
traditional surrogacy contract, In the Matter of Baby M, raised this very
issue. In that case, the court invalidated a traditional surrogacy contract
for $10,000, but ultimately placed the child in the custody of the intended
parents, utilizing the child's best-interest test.34 In the opinion, the court
stated "the evils inherent in baby-bartering are loathsome for a myriad of
reasons."35 However, while courts and society tend to treat traditional
surrogacy as immoral "baby selling," stifling legal protections in this area
of law penalizes honest parties to the contracts and does not further any
legitimate state interests.
B. TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTING WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES: FIVE APPROACHES
There is currently no federal law governing surrogacy contracts in all
fifty states, but some individual states have enacted their own surrogacy
regulations in the form of statutes. Because of this lack of federal
regulation, surrogacy contracts receive disparate treatment throughout the
United States.36 While the laws in these states vary by nuance, they can
generally be grouped into five subcategories of legal regulation: states
30. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 208 (2009) (discussing how intermediaries, such as agencies,
developed to lower the risk of uncertainty plaguing surrogacy market, especially considering
that "neither producers nor consumers tend to be repeat players in the baby market"). In this
same vein, individuals not using an agent intermediary especially need legal protections.
31. Ironically, the best statutory language for what is expected of a surrogacy
arrangement comes from the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/5
(2005) ("The purpose of this Act is to establish consistent standards and procedural
safeguards for the protection of all parties involved in a gestational surrogacy contract in
this State and to confirm the legal status of children born as a result of these contracts."). No
state, however, has undertaken the difficult task of enumerating what would be necessary
for an explicitly traditional surrogacy, where the roles of mother/surrogate are much more
difficult to differentiate.
32. Indeed, many adoption laws which hamper surrogacy contracting were created
because of this fear, or as one judge said in a New York adoption case, "the strong public
policy of this State against sanctioning or facilitating the 'sale' of children for adoption in
what may become a marketing in human beings." In re Juan P.H.C., 496 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631
(1985).
33. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
34. Id. at 1259.
35. Id. at 1241.
36. For a survey of the current laws in this area in major states, see Darra L. Hofman,
"Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe:" A State-by-State Survey of Surrogate Laws and Their
Disparate Gender Impact. 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 449 (2009).
250 [Vol. 23:2
Summer 20121 TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTING
where surrogacy contracts with payment are illegal, states where surrogacy
contracts are unenforceable in court, states where surrogacy contracts are
legally recognized (but limited), states which are still undecided but have
case law precedent, and states where surrogacy has been decriminalized.
1. Surrogacy Contracts Involving Payment Are Illegal
Some states make the creation and participation in paid surrogacy
contracts illegal. One argument in support of this category of surrogacy
law is that surrogacy for payment is harmful to the parties involved .
Because of this, states will impose civil and criminal penalties on the
parties involved in the contract, including the surrogate, intended parents,
and any third-party intermediary. Indeed, traditional surrogacy under this
subcategory of regulation is treated like voluntary prostitution, where a
human body is sold for payment. 39 The states that fall under this category
include Arizona,4 0 New York,4 1 Michigan,42 and the District of Columbia.43
The most common argument against this form of regulation is that it
violates a person's constitutional right to privacy.44 However, courts find
this argument to be unpersuasive since there is no enumerated right to
privacy in the constitution, and the privacy rights that are recognized are
not absolute.45 Furthermore, some argue making these contracts illegal
37. See Doe v. Att'y Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486-89 (holding a surrogacy for-pay
contract unlawful after considering the best interest of the child and the potential for
exploitation of the surrogate mother).
38. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
39. For an argument against this line of reasoning, see Jennifer Damelio & Kelly
Sorensen, Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy, 22 BIOETHIcs 269, 270-71 (2008).
40. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (2005) ("No person may enter into, induce,
arrange, procure or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract.");
see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-218(D) (2005) ("For the purposes of this section,
"surrogate parentage contract" means a contract, agreement or arrangement in which a
woman . . . agrees to conceive a child through natural or artificial insemination and to
voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to the child.").
41. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney 2010) ("No person or other entity shall
knowingly request, accept, receive, pay or give any fee, compensation or other
remuneration, directly or indirectly, in connection with any surrogate parenting contract, or
induce, arrange or otherwise assist in arranging a surrogate parenting contract for a fee,
compensation or other remuneration.").
42. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.859(l)-(2) (2011) ("A person shall not enter into, induce,
arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract for
compensation," and "A participating party . . . who knowingly enters into a surrogate
parentage contract for compensation is guilty of a misdemeanor.").
43. DC CODE § 16-402(a)-(b) (2001) ("Surrogate parenting contracts are prohibited and
rendered unenforceable in the District" and "any person or entity who . . . assists in the
formation of a surrogate parenting contract for a fee ... shall be subject to a civil
penalty ... or imprisonment.").
44. See Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981) (Michigan case holding that a statute to
prohibit payment in connection with adoption does not violate a person's fundamental right
to have children under the Constitutional right to privacy).
45. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (stating a woman's right to obtain an abortion
must be balanced with a state's interest in regulating public health); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
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restricts a woman's right to contract and infringes on her autonomy.46
However, even those who make this assertion recognize a potential
vulnerability of the parties to the surrogacy.4 7
By focusing on the illegality of payments in surrogate contract
relations, these states do not refuse to recognize surrogacy contracts in
general. Instead, these jurisdictions are more concerned with the
implications of allowing payment for the creation of life and the eradication
of parental rights. However, states do not concern themselves with
payments for all creation of life, but focus instead on limiting surrogacy.
For instance, doctors are paid to assist patients with fertility, men are paid
for sperm donations,4 8 and mothers are paid for giving birth and raising
children.4 9 Utilizing these examples, the states that ban for-pay contracts
should recognize that payment is a common element of conception and
should not be made illegal in the surrogacy context.
While the concerns some states have over "baby selling" are
understandable, the prevention of contractually enforceable traditional
surrogacy for payment will constructively wipe out the process even if the
state statutes do not expressly prohibit free traditional surrogacy. In other
words, payment in these contracts is an essential element to keep the
contracts not only fair, but enforceable. I will discuss this element of
fairness and the discrimination that can result in relation to all parties
involved in greater depth later in this Note.
2. Surrogacy Contracts Are Unenforceable in Court
Some states merely make surrogacy contracts void at the inception, and
thereby refuse to adjudicate issues arising from these contracts. The states
that fall under this subcategory include Nebraska,5 0 New York," North
U.S. 622 (1979) (upholding a parental consent requirement for minors to obtain an abortion
if there is a judicial bypass procedure); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) (upholding certain informed consent requirements for abortions); Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (holding the absence of a health exception does not render the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 unconstitutional).
46. Damelio & Sorensen, supra note 39, at 269.
47. Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2319 (1995) (stating that with regards to surrogacy
contracts, "it takes little imagination to realize that these contracts are not born of
momentary excesses or transient and base desires. No one thinks that surrogate
arrangements are a first choice. They are a desperate last hope, often for couples who have
tried for years to conceive without success").
48. Courts do not criminally prosecute men who are paid for sperm donation. Indeed, the
only prosecution that might occur is civil liability for child support if there is no valid
waiver of that right. See Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007) (known
sperm donor was sued for child support, but the court ultimately decided in his favor).
49. If not directly, then women are paid for motherhood indirectly in the form of child
support paid by genetic fathers. Indeed, the federal government requires states to provide
guidelines for child support payments under 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2000).
50. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200(1) (2008) ("A surrogate parenthood contract
entered into shall be void and unenforceable.").
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Dakota,52 and Virginia. While a state's decision to leave these situations
to the parties involved is better than preventing all surrogacy contracts by
making the process illegal, it leaves the parties involved vulnerable if there
is a dispute.
States that adopt this form of surrogacy legislation do so out of
apparent apathy towards the issue. In Nebraska, for example, the
legislative history suggests that their state statute was created with the
express purpose of preventing parties from using the courtroom to decide
these types of contract disputes.54 In other words, these laws are an attempt
to keep controversial moral and ethical issues from being decided in state
courts.
The obvious argument against this type of legislation is that it creates
an area of law where parties are faced with uncertainty. It is natural for
people to avoid entering into contracts that they think will be problematic
in the future. However, it is a function of the law to step in and regulate
when parties fail to anticipate these future contractual problems.
These states' decision to render the contracts void fails to take an
individual's freedom to contract into consideration, and assumes that
voiding a contract is a desirable solution to these unique situations.
However, when a traditional surrogacy contract is rendered void, it is still
undetermined who the parents are, who should receive custody, and what is
in the child's best interest. Indeed, imagine a situation where a single man
goes to a surrogate and she is inseminated with his sperm after signing a
surrogacy contract rendering the man with full custody and responsibility
for the child that will be born. If their contract is voided, state law has
created a dysfunctional family unit that was never agreed to or sought out
by the parties.
By refusing to recognize these contracts as valid and binding, states
miss an opportunity to protect their citizens from abusive contracts while
also promoting the creation of cohesive family units. Indeed, when parties
51. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§ 121-24 (McKinney 2010). Specifically, § 122 states:
"Surrogate parenting contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state,
and are void and unenforceable." Id. at § 122. Note that the comments after § 121 specify
that an agreement does not have to involve payment to be prohibited.
52. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2005) ("Any agreement in which a woman agrees
to become a surrogate or to relinquish that woman's rights and duties as parent of a child
conceived through assisted conception is void.").
53. See VA CODE ANN. § 20-160(4) (2008) ("All the parties have voluntarily entered into
the surrogacy contract and understand its terms and the nature, meaning, and effect of the
proceeding and understand that any agreement between them for payment of compensation
is void and unenforceable.").
54. See Kevin Tuininga, The Ethics of Surrogacy Contracts and Nebraska's Surrogacy
Law, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 186 (2008) (Nebraska Senator Ernie Chambers "suggested
he had no desire to legislate the morality or ethics of such arrangements but only to keep
resulting disputes out of the courts"). According to Tuininga, as of 2008, there was no
Nebraska case law on this issue. Id. at 185. Perhaps this is due to the state's unwillingness
to hear this type of case.
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fail to recognize the legal minefield they are stepping into with surrogacy
contracting, it is a state's responsibility to establish a clear rule of law that
will provide certainty and fairness for the parties involved. Failing to do so
does not prevent these contracts from being formed, but only creates a
troubling legal standard where no party knows what their legal rights are.
3. Surrogacy Contracts Are Legally Recognized
Some states have statutory schemes which legally recognize the need
for enforceable surrogacy contracts. These states include Arkansas,
Illinois, 56 Florida, 57 and New Hampshire.5 8 However, while these states are
in the forefront of surrogacy contract legalization, these states still impose
strict limitations that prevent many parties from utilizing legal surrogacy.
States that apply these restrictive laws are attempting to protect the
parties involved by making it difficult to participate in a legal surrogacy.
Many of these states specifically recognize gestational surrogacy, but fail to
explicitly recognize traditional surrogacy, perhaps because traditional
surrogacy is mistakenly seen as similar to adoption. These states impose
legitimate health restrictions, but often fail to recognize the multitude of
other people who might want to participate in traditional surrogacy. In
New Hampshire, for example, along with strict mental, physical, and
historical health requirements for the surrogate, surrogacy contracts are
only allowed if not for payment, 59 if judicially preauthorized 60 and if the
intended mother is infertile. 61 In other words, only an infertile heterosexual
couple with a healthy altruistic surrogate would even be considered under
this law.
The easiest criticism of this approach to surrogacy contracting is that it
unfairly limits who may participate in legal surrogacy. Fertile women are
disqualified from the outset.62 Furthermore, there is no explicit
55. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)-(c) (1987) (specifically mentioning surrogate
mothers when attempting to establish paternity).
56. Illinois specifically recognizes gestational surrogacy in the Gestational Surrogacy
Act, the purpose of which is stated as being "the protection of all parties involved in a
gestational surrogacy contract." See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/5 (2005).
57. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2011) (allowing gestational surrogacy contracts
subject to strict regulation and limitations on who may participate).
58. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16-19 (LexisNexis 2005) (specifically allowing
surrogacy contracts, subject to extreme regulation and limitations).
59. Id. at § 168-B:16 ("No person or entity shall promote or in any other way solicit or
induce for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, or with the intent or
expectation of receiving the same, any party or parties to enter into a surrogacy
arrangement.").
60. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16
61. Id. at § 168-B:17.
62. Id. ("The intended mother shall be medically determined to be physiologically
unable to bear a child without risk to her health or to the child's health."). Requiring
infertility in the statute fails to recognize the myriad of situations where fertile individuals or
couples would turn to alternative reproductive technologies. For example, if a fertile
woman has a family history of Huntington's disease, a rare yet genetically inherited
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consideration for single parents, gay men, lesbians, or infertile men under
this law. Additionally, by expressly forbidding payment, these states
impose an altruism requirement. But relying upon altruism assumes that
capable surrogate mothers will not discriminate while being altruistic. In
other words, depending upon altruism ignores the fact that certain classes
of people seeking traditional surrogacy may be discriminated against by
surrogates.
The best elements of this type of legislation are the involvement of
judicial authorization and intense health screening for the surrogates.
However, these elements can be incorporated into any surrogacy-for-pay
legislation without fear of inequitable or discriminatory results. While
permissible payment within these contractual schemes will not alleviate all
problems within traditional surrogacy, it will at the very least, open up this
assisted reproductive technology option to more intended parents and
surrogates.
4. Surrogacy Contracts Are an Undecided Issue
Many states have not enacted any statutes to address surrogacy
contracts. States that fall under this subcategory include California, 63
Kentucky, 64 Ohio,65 and Massachusetts. 66  Without guidance from the
neurological disorder, is afraid to have genetic children but is physically capable, she is still
excluded under these statutes requiring infertility.
63. See Adoption of Matthew B., 232 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1251 (1991) (refusing to allow
traditional surrogate to revoke consent to adoption when it was in the best interest of the
child to go with the intended parents); Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.App.4th 84, 87-93 (1993)
(holding gestational surrogate had no parental rights to the child born from surrogacy, based
on an intent test still applied today); In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal.App.4th 1218,
1222 (1994) (holding traditional surrogacy contract is unenforceable by itself because
attempt to deprive surrogate of parental rights by contract is inconsistent with adoption laws
of the state).
64. See Baby Boy VanWey v. Christine VanWey, 656 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Ky. 1983)
(holding that expansion or contraction of state laws on termination of parental rights is not
for the court to decide); Surrogate Parenting Association, Inc. v. Com. ex rel. Armstrong,
704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (refusal to prosecute a surrogacy agency because there was no
guarantee that adoption laws would be violated if spouse of intended father does not adopt
the child after payment). Note, however, that the legislature responded to this ruling by
instituting KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (2005).
65. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 764-65 (Oh. 1994) (holding that intent was an
inappropriate measure for determining parentage); J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Oh.
2007) (holding that Ohio state public policy does not bar gestational surrogacy contracts, but
stipulates that the case "does not involve, and we draw no conclusions about, traditional
surrogates and Ohio's public policy concerning them").
66. Problems arise when a state, like Massachusetts, has a statutory presumption that
"any child born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of
her husband, shall be considered the legitimate child of the mother and such husband."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46 § 4B (West 2011). See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796
(Mass. 1998) (holding traditional contract not enforceable because mother cannot give up
parentage rights before the child is born and compensation was a factor in her decision to
relinquish those rights). But see Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d
255
legislature, the issue is left up to the courts and can lead to a variety of
results. California, for example, has famously used parental intent as a way
in which to decide this complex issue. 67  However, California has also
declined to enforce traditional surrogacy contracts, not because they are
contrary to the state's public policy, but because adoption laws prevent
such contracts.
Without a clear rule, individuals interested in a valid surrogacy contract
do not know which laws to follow. Using the California example above,
individuals would not necessarily know to follow adoption laws when they
are contracting with a surrogate. These are different legal issues, one
involving the legal parental status of existing children and the other
involving the intentional creation of life through reproductive technology,
and the laws that govern one of these issues cannot stretch to govern the
other. However, if the courts do not have a relevant surrogacy law to
apply, these individuals may be subjected to adoption law.
The states which have failed to enact their own laws on surrogacy are
ignoring the unique nature of surrogacy contracts. When a private party
contracts with another private party to create parental rights on one hand,
and destroy them on the other, a clear law needs to be in place to guide the
parties involved. While court involvement may be necessary in certain
circumstances, the law of the state in this legal issue should not be
considered on a case-by-case basis. This promotes nine months or more of
uncertainty, which is not in the best interest of any party or child.
5. Surrogacy Is Not Criminalized
Finally, a few states have taken the step to decriminalize surrogacy
arrangements in favor of the parties who willingly choose to participate in
them. This subcategory is unique because, while surrogacy contracts are
not explicitly promoted in these states, the state legislatures have gone out
their way to decriminalize the surrogacy-for-payment arrangement. These
69 7071states include Iowa, Alabama,70 and West Virginia.
1133, 1135 (Mass. 2001) (holding that a hospital should put intended parents' names on the
birth certificates of unborn gestational surrogate twins).
67. See Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.4th 84, 86 (1993) (court determined the natural mother
in a gestational surrogacy arrangement was based on the original intent of the parties,
awarding motherhood to the genetic parent who wanted to rear the child and not the one
who gave birth); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal.App.4th 1410 (1998) (holding that
even in a traditional surrogacy, the couple who intended to create and rear the child at
inception are the legal parents of the child, regardless of genetics).
68. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1222 (1994) ("We decline to
enforce the agreement, not for the public policy reasons sometimes advanced by those who
oppose surrogacy, but because enforcement of a traditional surrogacy contract by itself is
incompatible with the parentage and adoption statutes already on the books.").
69. IOWA CODE § 710.11 (2005) ("A person commits a class 'C' felony when the person
purchases or sells or attempts to purchase or sell an individual to another person. This
section does not apply to a surrogate mother arrangement.").
[Vol. 23:2HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL256
Summer 20121 TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTING
While these states have taken a step in the right direction, this does not
go far enough to protect the rights of surrogates, intended parents, and
children, and can lead to confusing legal results. For example, in the state
of New York where surrogacy without payment has been decriminalized, a
surrogacy contract is unenforceable in court, but "parties to a surrogacy
contract which does not involve any fee are not subject to the civil and
criminal penalties prescribed in DRL §123."72 Therefore, in New York,
individual private parties can enter into a no-payment traditional surrogacy
arrangement, without penalty, as long as there is no legal dispute. If,
however, the surrogate mother decides to assert her parental rights, the
intended parents face uncertain results. 73
By looking at these five subcategories of surrogacy contract regulation
present in the United States, it is clear to see why there are so many
proponents for uniform federal regulation in this field of law.7 4 The variety
of legal rules makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a surrogate family to
create a binding arrangement that is beneficial to all parties. I am not
arguing that all surrogacy contracts should be recognized with no
regulation, but instead that consenting adults who want to create a for-pay
contractual relationship should have the ability to do so in all states, and
not be forced to rely on "luck of the draw" court jurisdictions.
70. ALA. CODE 1975 § 26-IOA-34 (LexisNexis 2010) ("It shall be a Class C felony for
any person or agency to pay money or anything of value to a parent for the placement of a
child for adoption, for the consent to an adoption, or for cooperation in the completion of an
adoption" but "surrogate motherhood is not intended to be covered by this section.").
71. W. VA. CODE § 48-22-803(a)-(e) (2006) (Any person or agency who knowingly
offers, gives or agrees to give to another person money . . . in consideration for ... a transfer
of the legal or physical custody of said child . . . is guilty of a felony . . . but this does not
prohibit payment of fees and expenses included in any agreement in which a woman agrees
to become a surrogate mother.").
72. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney 2010).
73. See In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818-19 (N.Y. 1990) (New York case
considering surrogacy for payment. The Family Court of Kings County held that: (1)
surrogate parenting agreement was void for violating statutory prohibition against
acceptance of compensation in exchange for surrender of child for adoption, and (2) court
would accept natural mother's surrender of her child only if she would swear under oath that
she had not and would not accept $10,000 promised to her under the surrogate parenting
agreement. This highlights the convoluted results that may occur and rest solely on the
decision of the surrogate mother. Since the intended parents have no way of knowing what
the surrogate mother will do, there is no certainty they will retain parental rights).
74. See generally Rains, infra note 91; Epstein, supra note 47; Stephanie Schultz,
Surrogacy Arrangements: Who are the "Parents" of a Child Born Through Artificial
Reproductive Techniques?, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 273, 292-93 (1995); Rena Deutscher, Are
You My Mother?: The Legal Obstacles of Assistive Reproductive Technology, 4 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 311 (1999); Jerald V. Hale, From Baby M to Jaycee B.: Fathers,
Mothers, and Children in the Brave New World, 24 J. CONTEMP. L., 335, 341-42 (1998);
Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call For Uniformity,
35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300 (2007).
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III. IMPROPER PAYMENT REGULATION IGNORES THE
BIGGER PICTURE
While states are concerned with the public policy argument for
preventing the promotion of "baby selling," the statutes they create to
regulate surrogacy contracts can lead to discriminatory results. Of course,
states have a substantial interest in regulating this area of law, but the utter
failure to regulate uniformly highlights a failure to recognize all of the
elements involved in traditional surrogacy relationships. Even if courts,
legislatures, and society in general frown upon the "sale" of children,
payment restrictions do not alleviate these concerns, but only create new
ones. To understand this, we must examine the motivations involved in
traditional surrogacy relationship.
A. IGNORING SURROGATE MOTIVATIONS
Public policy concerns regarding payment for the creation of children
have led to a misunderstanding of the motivations of surrogates. Indeed,
states that permit no-pay surrogacy contracting based solely on the altruism
of the surrogate mother make two distinct assumptions. First, there is the
assumption that giving birth should be altruistic. Second, there is the
assumption that parties interested in surrogacy for payment would undergo
the process solely for payment.
1. Assumption That Surrogacy Births Should Be Altruistic
The assumption that birth should be an altruistic event is a strange one,
with little historical backing. 75 Although we might like to think that
parenthood is altruistic in nature, that is just not the case. As many of the
regulations on surrogacy contracting come from adoption laws, it is
peculiar that this idea of altruism developed, since it would be difficult to
argue that children are put up for adoption out of altruism.77  Instead,
adoptive processes developed out of necessity and not altruism.
75. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 850 (2000) (explaining that in
the Bible, Sarah, Rachel, and Leah all used traditional surrogates, their handmaids, in order
to give their husbands children. However, this process was accomplished sexually, instead
of scientifically). While traditional surrogacy is not a new process, the technology used in
surrogacy today is relatively modem. See Sperm Banking History, CAL. CRYOBANK,
http://www.cryobank.com/Learning-Center/Sperm-Banking-101/Sperm-Banking-History/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (explaining that the first recorded human artificial insemination
was done as an experiment in 1884 without the woman's knowledge); 'Father of Test Tube
Baby' Wins Nobel Prize for Medicine, CNN (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/HEALTH/10/04/sweden.nobel.medicine/index.html?hpt=T2.
76. Reproduction is necessary for the survival of the human species. For a more
contemporary view on motherhood and biology, see SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER
NATURE: MATERNAL INSTINCTS AND How THEY SHAPE THE HUMAN SPECIEs (1999).
77. When looking at the motivations of the parents who put children up for adoption,
some of the most common reasons are poverty, health, age of the mother, neglect, substance
abuse, inability to raise a child, or just unwillingness to do so. See Why Parents Put Their
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The birth process is arduous. Many women do not want to give birth to
their own child, let alone someone else's. To assume a woman would go
through this process for the love of a stranger is unrealistic. This is not to
say that no women would go through a traditional surrogacy for free.
Indeed, there are enough success stories to prove otherwise.7 8  However,
there are not enough altruistic women to fill the need within this area of
reproductive technology, and there should not have to be.
Furthermore, there is a discrepancy when women are expected to give
birth out of altruism, but are rarely expected to raise a child out of
altruism. 7 9 While childrearing may be more expensive than childbirth,
society and the law cannot support a double standard which permits
payment for one while villainizing payment for the other. Since the
parental right of motherhood is not expected to be altruistic, the creation of
a parenthood right through traditional surrogacy should not have an
expectation of altruism either.
This preconceived notion of altruism places an expectation on women
that is not placed on men. While women are expected to give birth
altruistically, men are not expected to donate sperm, the closest example of
a third-party male's involvement in surrogacy relationship, without
payment.80 The fact that the sperm was purchased, rather than donated out
of compassion for an infertile parent's need, does not make the process any
more or less akin to "baby selling." This altruism requirement places an
impractical and unbalanced burden on women.
There is no strong explanation of why altruism should be a requirement
for women who are willing to be surrogate mothers. Under no
circumstances does a no-pay relationship make the burden and
responsibility of legally severing parental rights any easier to bear. If an
altruistic person is also paid for her surrogacy services, this would not
Children Up for Adoption, CHILD ADOPTION MATTERS, http://www.child-adoption-
matters.com/children-up-for-adoption.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011); Jessica Lynn,
Reasons Children Are Put Up for Adoption, LIVESTRONG.COM (June 14, 2011),
http://www.livestrong.com/article/233521-reasons-children-are-put-up-for-adoption. None
of these are linked to altruism, but instead emphasize necessity.
78. Websites for matching services tend to have the most success stories available. See
Success Stories, SURROGATE MOTHERS ONLINE, http://www.surromomsonline.
com/successes/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2012); see also JERRY BIGNER ET AL., A GAY COUPLE'S
JOURNEY THROUGH SURROGACY: INTENDED FATHERS (2006).
79. Childbirth and childrearing are treated differently with regards to payment. Women
can be paid in the context of child support, spousal support for women who stayed at home
to raise children, or even for childcare.
80. This divide is even more pronounced when you compare the short time commitment
and ease of involvement for sperm donation with the standard nine months of pregnancy,
doctors' appointments, regulated eating and social habits required of a surrogate mother.
See Calfornia Cryobank Sperm Donor Compensation, SPERMBANK.COM, http://www.
spermbank.com/newdonors/index.cfm?ID=4 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (California
Cryobank suggests that sperm donors can make up to $1,200 per month. They also
"periodically offer incentives such as movie tickets or gift certificates for extra time and
effort expended by participating sperm donors.").
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make her less likely to perform on a surrogacy contract, but may help to
ease the burden of giving birth.
2. Assumption that Surrogacy for Payment is Not Altruistic
The second assumption made by legislators who enact surrogacy
statutes forbidding payment is that paid contracts lack any altruistic
motivations. But traditional surrogacy is not quick or anonymous, like
sperm donation can be. Regardless of the amount paid, traditional
surrogacy still requires a minimum of a nine-month time investment.
Pregnancy involves dramatic changes in lifestyle, diet, health, and weight.8'
It carries with it inherent health risks of potential miscarriage, future
medical issues, and death.82 At the end of this time, when the surrogate
gives birth and relinquishes her biological child to the intended parent, the
surrogate may be subjected to potential social stigma if she has to explain
away her past pregnancy. Considering all of this, it is clear to see that any
surrogate would have to have some altruistic motivations or it is doubtful
that she would ever begin the process.
There may be a fear that legalizing and regulating payments for
surrogate children will open up flood gates for women who will want to
participate in this process. But this unsubstantiated fear could be alleviated
in ways other than an outright ban on payment, such as limiting the amount
paid or limiting the number of legal conceptions per traditional surrogate's
lifetime. Either of these simple solutions would still recognize the need for
payments in a traditional surrogate contract without allowing a surrogate to
resort to surrogacy as a career.
B. IGNORING INTENDED PARENT MOTIVATIONS
As previously stated, statutes designed to prevent "baby selling" were
developed for reasons of public policy.8 4  Adoption laws designed to
81. See During Pregnancy, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/pregnancygateway/
during.html (last updated July 26, 2011) (listing lifestyle considerations during pregnancy,
including smoking, drinking, vaccinations, and travel); Pregnancy Complications, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/PregComplications.htm (last
updated Jan. 19, 2012) (stating that health complications during pregnancy can range from
mild to severe, and gestational weight gain affects one out of five pregnant women).
82. See Pregnancy, WOMENsHEALTH.Gov, http://womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/you-are-
pregnant/pregnancy-complications.cfm (last updated Sept. 27, 2010) (listing potential health
issues related to pregnancy); Pregnancy Complications, supra note 81 (stating that in
general, pregnancy related death is possible but not common).
83. These solutions, discussed in further detail later, would also eliminate concerns that
surrogates would resort to surrogacy contracts in times of need and be contrary to public
policy.
84. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2010) ("As with many other states,
New York has a strong public policy against the payment of non-pregnancy related fees or
expenses to the birth parents in order to deter the sale of babies."): see also In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (1998) (showing ingrained public policy contempt for these contracts
because "we find the payment of money to a "surrogate" mother illegal, perhaps criminal,
and potentially degrading to women").
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combat payment for termination of parental rights were similarly designed
for the purpose of public policy. 5  However, these arguments are not
always persuasive to the courts.8 6 Furthermore, public policy arguments in
this field of law should be discontinued for two reasons. First, with
changing technologies becoming increasingly available, the early statute
drafters could not have anticipated surrogacy-for-pay contracts being
widely utilized. More importantly, however, these statutes do not reflect
the motivations of individual intended parents seeking to enter into a
reliable surrogacy-for-pay contract.
1. Avoidance of Complicated Family Structures
Individuals looking to enter into a contract do so with the hope that
there will be a dependable outcome. In contract law, payment is given in
consideration of a certain desirable outcome." However, states that do not
allow paid surrogacy contracts eliminate this element of certainty within
surrogate contract relationships.
The least desirable result is that previously unacquainted parties to a
surrogacy contract will be forced to share custody of a child born in
accordance with a surrogacy contract. Since, in traditional surrogacy, the
birth mother is the biological mother and the sperm donor is often the
intended father, it is likely that both sides have legal and biological claims
to the child.89  While this result is unlikely given courts' preference for
utilizing a "child's best interest" standard in deciding custody cases, 90 the
child's future is uncertain without uniform results and regulation.
Furthermore, there is the legitimate concern that children will be
moved around during their formative years while courts try to detangle the
85. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234.
86. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1222 (1994) ("We decline to
enforce the agreement, not for the public policy reasons sometimes advanced by those who
oppose surrogacy."); Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.4th 84, 95 (1993) (holding gestational
surrogacy contracts, on their face, do not violate public policy).
87. Indeed, internet agencies allow for prospective parents to connect with potential
surrogates from all across the country. Surrogacy.com has their own classified section,
which acts as a matching service, and is organized by geographic region and type of
surrogacy requested. See Browse TASC Classifieds, SURROGACY.COM, http://www.
surrogacy.com/cgi-bin/classifieds/classifieds.cgi (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
88. See U.C.C. § 3-303(b) (2010) ("'Consideration' means any consideration sufficient to
support a simple contract. The drawer or maker of an instrument has a defense if the
instrument is issued without consideration. If an instrument is issued for a promise of
performance, the issuer has a defense to the extent performance of the promise is due and
the promise has not been performed. If an instrument is issued for value as stated in
subsection (a), the instrument is also issued for consideration.").
89. This is much more complicated in traditional surrogacy than in gestational surrogacy
because at least one party (the surrogate) is always biologically related to the child. See In
re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 720 (Tenn. 2005) ("A traditional surrogate mother thus has a
genetic connection to the child whom she nonetheless bears on behalf of others."). Couple
this with the genetic relationship of the sperm donor, and both sides have genetic claims.
90. See Blackburn, supra note 25, at 363-64.
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contractual mess without uniform federal guidance on the issue. 91 Indeed,
in order for traditional surrogacy to survive, there needs to be a mechanism
by which surrogates and intended parents can reach an agreement before
the child is born so that the child is not born into a complicated family
structure. Therefore, payment in this respect would not be for "baby
selling," but rather, would encourage peaceful outcomes that are in the best
interest of all parties.
2. Promote Privacy and Non-Disclosure
Another motivation of intended parents who wish to engage in
traditional surrogacy for payment is that they would like the arrangement to
be confidential. This may be because of their own celebrity,9 2 preference
for secrecy,9 3 fear of embarrassment,9 4 or for the sake of the child.95
Payment helps ensure, not only a positive result at the culmination of the
pregnancy, but also a positive experience during and after the pregnancy
that conforms to the intended parents' wishes.
91. See J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Oh. 2007) (showing an extreme example, known as
the "Erie Surrogate Triplets" case, where a gestational surrogate and intended parents'
custody battle in Pennsylvania for three children born under contract ended with the
intended parents gaining custody and the surrogate losing all contact privileges two and a
half years after the surrogate refused to give up custody per the contractual agreement). For
an analysis of this case and why it exemplifies a need for adoption of the Uniform Parentage
Act, see Robert E. Rains, What the Erie "Surrogate Triplets" Can Teach State Legislatures
About the Need to Enact Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 56 CLEv. ST. L.
REv. 1 (2008).
92. Recently, many celebrities have entered into surrogacy arrangements for the birth of
their children. Luchina Fisher, From Deidra Hall to Elton John: Stars Who Use Surrogates
Grows, ABC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/deidre-hall-elton-
john-stars-surrogates-grows/story?id=12529242 (listing the celebrities who have used
surrogacy services to include Elton John, Sarah Jessica Parker, Neil Patrick Harris, Cristiano
Ronaldo, Ricky Martin, Kelsey Grammer, Angela Bassett, and Deidre Hall). For-pay
contracts allow these celebrities not to fear intrusion into their private lives if the surrogate
is also paid to be secretive. These secrecy concerns became a real issue for Sarah Jessica
Parker when two police officers were accused of breaking into her surrogate's home to find
evidence to sell to tabloids regarding the pregnancy. See Ohio Police Chiefs Face Trial in
Sarah Jessica Parker Case, USA TODAY (Oct. 16, 2009, 2:52 PM), http://www.
usatoday.com/life/people/2009-10-16-sarah-jessica-parker N.htm?csp=34.
93. This would be especially true if the surrogacy was necessitated because of health
reasons that are not known to one's social circle.
94. Women who are incapable of not having their own children may be embarrassed or
even outcasts in certain cultures. For an argument on how infertility can be seen or even
classified as a handicap that subjects individuals to discrimination, see David Orentlicher,
Discrimination Out ofDismissiveness: The Example oflnfertility, 85 IND. L.J. 143 (2010).
95. Parents do not always disclose to a child their genetic parentage for fear that the
children will not understand or will be ridiculed for being different. But see Garrison, supra
note 75, at 890-92 (discussing how adoption procedures have moved away from secrecy in
favor of open information).
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3. Promote Safety and Certainty
Intended parents may choose to forgo other means of conception in
favor of a traditional surrogacy-for-pay contract for their own safety.
While some surrogacy contracting regulations created by states recognize
that infertile couples or those in poor health have a legitimate reason for
employing surrogacy, 96 this creates disparate results for everyone else.
Pregnancy can be dangerous for any woman, and not just those with health
conditions or infertility.9 7  Indeed, some women may prefer to forgo
pregnancy for fear of complications, whether that fear is medically
grounded or not, and are willing to pay for that reassurance.
Furthermore, intended parents may choose traditional surrogacy-for-
pay contracts for the safety of the future child. In other words, the
necessary dietary and lifestyle restrictions during pregnancy may not seem
so cumbersome if the surrogate is being paid for the inconvenience. The
payment may encourage surrogate mothers to be diligent about their health
during pregnancy.
4. Ensure Healthy Genes
Intended parents will inevitably want to choose a surrogate who
conforms to their ideal specifications for human health. They will want to
avoid, where possible, genetic disorders such as diabetes, Huntington's
disease, Tay-Sachs disease, and cerebral palsy.98  Surrogates who are
screened and are not genetic carriers for these disorders will inevitably be
more highly sought after. Considered in this light, payment is not being
used to procure a child, but is instead being used to help insure the future
health of the child.
Perhaps legislators fear that traditional surrogacy-for-payment
contracts will create an incentive for individuals to choose only the best
possible DNA for their future children, creating genetic discrimination.
However, it may be in the best interest of the intended parents and children
to choose the genetic makeup of the child if it helps prevent the spread of
genetic disorders. This genetic discrimination occurs naturally anyway
when individuals choose their mates, their adoptive children, or their sperm
or egg donors. Some would even argue that the preexisting procedures for
natural birth alternatives, such as sperm donation and adoption, promote
racism, 99 Sexism,00 ageism, 10 1and homophobial 02 as they are currently
96. For an example, see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17 (LexisNexis 2005).
97. The Fresno Women's Medical Group provides a three-page list of general health risks
associated with pregnancy. See General Risks, FRESNO WOMEN'S MEDICAL GROUP,
http://www.fwmg.org/forms/Risk Pregnancy.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
98. See Genetics/Birth Defects, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.
nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/geneticsbirthdefects.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2011).
99. See Dov Fox, Choosing Your Child's Race, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (2011)
(arguing that sperm donation banks separating donors by race promotes racism and
encourages purchasers to pay for same-race specimens); see also R. Richard Banks, The
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enacted and regulated. Since genetic discrimination already exists, whether
it is conscious or not, refusal to permit surrogacy for-pay contracts is not
narrowly tailored to address this issue.
5. Avoidance of Discrimination
Lastly, the failure to allow payment contracts for traditional surrogacy
shows a lack of compassion for lesbians, gay men, and single individuals
who are incapable of procreating without the assistance of an additional
party or without employing some other means. 10 3 However, regardless of
this fact, these subgroups have traditionally been seen as unconventional or
even unfit parents. 10 4 Indeed there is a societal bias in favor of straight,
two-parent, married households, which has been incorporated into the
law. 05 For example, Florida enacted an adoption statute (which was
Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory
State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998) (arguing state policies of race matching for adoptive
parents and children promotes racism and should be abolished).
100. In some cultures where a specific gender of child is favored, the opposite gender is
more readily available to adopt. Therefore, parents who are looking for that less-favored
gender are better able to adopt. See Twila L. Perry, Feminism, Adoption, and Diversity, 23
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 247, 248 (2002).
101. Sperm and egg donors are required to be within a certain age range. At one website,
123donate.com, sperm donors are required to be between the ages of nineteen and thirty-
nine and egg donors must be between the ages of nineteen and thirty-one. See Sperm Donor
Requirements, 123DONATE.COM, http://www.123donate.com/spermdonor requirements.html
(last visited Feb. 8, 2012); Egg Donor Requirements, 123DONATE.COM,
http://www.123donate.comleggdonorrequirements.htmi respectively (last visited Feb. 8,
2012).
102. For a discussion on the many arguments made against gay adoption, see Amy D.
Ronner, Gay and Lesbian Adoption: Banishing the Pied Piper, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 207
(2005).
103. By this, I simply mean that the reproductive processes of two parties, one of each
gender, is required to create a child. Single and gay women have a much simpler option
because they only need a sperm donor, who can remain anonymous. Single and homosexual
men, however, require the direct involvement of a woman who will gestate the child to term.
104. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (holding that a lesbian mother
was unfit despite the state's policy against per se unfitness for lesbian mothers); Kate
Kendell, Lesbian and Gay Parents in Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, HUMAN
RIGHTS MAGAZINE (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
human rightsmagazine home/irrhr summer03_custody.html (discussing problems faced
by lesbian and gay parents attempting to get custody of children, including six states which
had an automatic presumption that lesbian and gay parents are unfit as of 2003); Ronner,
supra note 102; see also Amanda C. Pustinik, Private Ordering, Legal Ordering, and the
Getting of Children: A Counter History of Adoption Law, 20 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 263
(2002) (explaining that gays and lesbians are typically discriminated against when being
considered for adoption); Kristi L. Nelson, Unwed and Unbothered: Single Motherhood
Carries Little Stigma Today, KNOXVILLE NEWS (Mar. 14, 2010),
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/201 0/mar/14/unwed-and-unbothered-single-motherhood-
carries-lit/ (stating that although two out of five children today have unwed mothers, unwed
motherhood used to be scandalous).
105. See N.H. REV. STAT. § 168-B:1(VII) (LexisNexis 2011) (this state surrogacy statute
has no recognition of potential parents who are unmarried or restricted from marrying, since
"intended parents," including "intended father" and "intended mother," means persons who
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recently held unconstitutional) which explicitly stated "No person eligible
to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."l 0 6
This discriminatory law exemplifies why individual private parties should
be permitted to legally contract into a traditional surrogacy, since they face
rampant discrimination as potential parents.
When individuals are faced with a lack of other options, or fear
discrimination in other channels, enforceable surrogacy contracts offer an
alternative. While I am clearly not advocating that gay men, lesbians, or
single individuals be forced to pay to have surrogate children in all
circumstances, they should be allowed to contract for traditional surrogacy
for payment to help ensure certain desirable results.
IV. FEDERAL REGULATION
Family law and domestic relations have typically been regulated by the
states.10 7 However, these state regulations are not exclusive, and there are
many examples when the Supreme Court or federal government address
and overturn state laws in these areas. os As previously discussed, the
current laws regarding surrogacy contracts vary between states, resulting in
a confusing legal standard. Frustration over the lack of a clear rule has led
some scholars to suggest taking surrogacy regulation away from the states
and advocate federal legislation. For the following reasons, regulation of
traditional surrogacy contracts should be federal in nature.
A. PREVIOUS REGULATION IS INADEQUATE
Subject to certain constitutional restrictions, states regulate issues in
family law. As seen above, however, individual states have taken
dramatically different approaches towards traditional surrogacy-for-pay
"are married to each other, and who, complying with the requirements of this chapter, enter
into a surrogacy contract with a surrogate by which they are to become the parents of the
resulting child.").
106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2006). But see Fla. Dep't of Children & Families
v. In re Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So.3d 79 (Fla. 2010) (holding a statute barring
homosexuals from adopting is unconstitutional).
107. See Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 93 CAL. L. REv. 667, 676 (2010)
(stating "marriage laws have always been state laws"); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564
(1995) (rejecting government argument because federal power through the commerce clause
does not reach areas "where States historically have been sovereign," and even the dissent
recognized the commerce clause stops short of family law); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
404 (1975) (recognizing domestic relations as "an area that has long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States").
108. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (overturning Connecticut law
banning contraceptive use); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding Virginia's race
restrictions on marriage are unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(holding Texas state law making same-sex intimate sexual conduct illegal is
unconstitutional); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (1996) (Defense of Marriage Act is a
federal act that allows states to refuse to give full force and effect to "a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage.").
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contracts. However, there is a distinct dissatisfaction with the way
surrogacy law is handled at the state level.' 09 Legal professionals and
legislators recognize the need for change in this area of law and have
attempted to fix the problem in the past. However, these attempts have
been largely unsuccessful, which is due in part to the fact that states still
have the power to adopt these alternatives or not.
In 1988, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws attempted to rectify the lack of uniformity in this area of law by
creating the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA)." 0 However, as stated in the prefatory note to the act, "[t]his
Act is not a surrogacy regulatory act nor was it intended to be.""' Instead,
the intention is to provide for the well-being of children created through
assisted conception.112 Therefore, the USCACA offers two dramatically
different alternatives for how to treat surrogacy contracts. Under
Alternative A, a surrogacy agreement is valid if it meets certain judicial
standards.11 3  Under Alternative B, the surrogacy agreement is void.114
Since states are free to adopt these uniform laws at will, the USCACA still
does not solve the problem of uniformity among states. Indeed, states are
free to not enact the Act at all, as many states have. For example, because
California failed to enact this legislation, it was not applicable in the
landmark case Johnson v. Calvert.115 Currently, only North Dakota"'6 and
Virginia'"7 have partially adopted this Act, leaving the rest of the states
without uniform regulation.
In 2008, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology (Model Act), which would
help alleviate the confusion faced by judges and practitioners addressing
issues in alternative reproductive technology (ART)."' 8 The Model Act
specifically addresses concerns about surrogacy contracting and payment
of reasonable fees to surrogates.'1 9 The drafting of the Model Act began in
the 1980s in response to the Baby M decision and the increased use of
109. SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION, 30
(2007) (stating that between 1987 and 1992, 208 state surrogacy bills were introduced but
not passed, and from 1993 to 2003, 51 more bills were introduced). The large number of
proposed legislation suggests the dissatisfaction with the laws on the books.
110. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988), available at
http://www.law.upenn.eduibll/archives/ulc/fnact99/uscaca88.pdf
111. Id. at Prefatory Note.
112. Id.
113. Id. at §5, Alternative A.
114. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT supra note 110 at §5,
Alternative B.
115. Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.4th 84, 111 (1993).
116. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01 et seq. (2005).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (West 2011).




Summer 20121 TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTING
ART.120 However, the Act is a model act, and only attempts to create
suggested provisions which states can adopt in part or in whole.' 21 In other
words, these rules only provide guidance to states that are willing to accept
them.
B. FEDERAL REGULATION IS THE ANSWER
Although surrogacy would be considered part of family law, which is
traditionally regulated by the states, uniform federal law would best serve
this unique area of law. First, a uniform federal legal standard would
eliminate the possibility of forum shopping.12 2 In other words, intended
parents could not make a contract in a state with more favorable surrogacy
laws.12 3 This would help eliminate unequal bargaining between the parties
to the contract.124  Second, with a uniform federal rule, concerns over
where the contract was drafted or signed, where the child was born, where
the intended parents live, and where the surrogate is a resident would not
matter. If the rule is the same no matter what, these considerations are no
longer relevant. Finally, a uniform federal rule will allow judges to have a
clear standard to apply when litigation arises.
Many industrialized nations have severe limitations or even bans on
surrogacy.125 These limitations are done at a national level.126  In the
United States, however, attempts to nationally ban surrogacy contracts have
failed.127  In 1987, Ohio Representative Tom Luken proposed the
Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987, for the purpose of preventing
surrogacy contracting. 28 However, the bill never passed. In 1989, two
senators again proposed legislation that would ban surrogacy at the federal
level.129 This legislation failed as well. However, just because surrogacy
contracts have failed to be banned at the federal level does not mean this is
not the proper forum for regulation of these contracts.
120. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law ofART. The New
American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42
FAM. L.Q. 203, 203-04 (2008).
121. Id. at 206.
122. Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 2011, at 52, 57.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. MARKENS, supra note 109, at 23 (stating that these countries include "Australia,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, and Switzerland").
126. Id.
127. Id. at 26.
128. MARKENS, supra note 109, at 26.
129. Id.; Surrogate Bill, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 2, 1989), available at http://
articles.orlandosentinel.com/1989-02-02/news/8902030283_1_surrogate-mother-desperate-




While payment, as argued earlier, is an essential element of
traditional surrogacy contracting to ensure proper outcomes for all parties,
this payment should not be left unregulated. Traditional surrogacy
contracts are made for the express purpose of creating a human life, and
payment regulation is necessary to address the legitimate concerns brought
out by this type of arrangement. Banning payment fails to recognize the
inherent dangers of abuse in traditional surrogacy contracts. 13 0
A. REGULATING THE CONTRACTS THEMSELVES
The reality is that payment is not enough, by itself, to induce parties to
engage in contractual surrogacy. If it were, landmark cases in this field
would never have occurred because the surrogate mothers would have been
satisfied with the offered payment.131 Instead, payment should be seen as a
place-holder or peace offering for the surrogate to successfully negotiate a
binding contract before the child is even born.
1. Avoidance of Adhesion Contracts
There should be a legitimate concern over the unequal bargaining
power inherent in traditional surrogacy contracts.13 2 While I advocate the
express use and uniform recognition of these contracts, there is ripe
potential for abuse in the contracts themselves due to the vulnerabilities of
the parties. 133 Therefore, contracts of this nature should never be reduced
to form contracts,134 but should always be created with the specific needs
and desires of the specific parties in mind. These contracts should be
regulated considering the vast potential for unequal bargaining power in
this type of contract.
130. Indeed, there is a legitimate fear that contracts of this type might rise to the level of
unconscionability. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt.1, (2004) ("The basic test is whether, in the light
of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the term or contract involved is so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.").
131. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84
(1961); In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal.App.4th 1218 (1994).
132. Adhesion contracts are defined in many ways, but perhaps best put by Justice
Tobriner in Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal.App.2d 690, 694 (1961) ("The term
signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the
contract or reject it.").
133. See Kelly A. Anderson, Certainty in an Uncertain World: The Ethics of Drafting
Surrogacy Contracts, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 615, 627-28 (2008) (stating common
opposition to surrogacy contracts in general is due to the perceived exploitation of women in
these contracts due to unequal bargaining power or the perceived exploitation of individuals
using surrogacy due to societal pressure to have children); Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish
Women, Black Women: Guarding Against the Oppression of Surrogacy, 8 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 29, 52 (arguing that minority women may be unable to engage in meaningful
bargaining due to socioeconomic pressures).
134. This is more likely to occur when an agency controls contacting.
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First, in some instances, the surrogate will be in an extreme position of
power. If an intended parent is turning to surrogacy as a last resort, 35 there
is potential for extortion, since the surrogate not only has legal rights, but
also has possession of the child for the first nine months, if not longer. 6
Intended parents may feel compelled to acquiesce to the surrogate's every
demand for fear of losing the child. This might compel a desperate couple
to sign a contract that is clearly not in their favor.
In other cases, the intended parent will hold an extreme position of
power. Money can be a powerful motivator to induce an individual into
action that they normally would not take.' 3 7 But the question in traditional
surrogacy is not necessarily one of surrogate exploitation.'3 8  Indeed, I
would argue that women should freely be allowed to make these
contractual decisions through freedom to contract.13 9
Due to the potential for unequal bargaining power by either the
surrogate or the intended parents, surrogacy contracts should never be
reduced to form contracts. The situation is too unique to not be considered
on a case by case basis. Uniform regulation of these contracts, and not a
failure to recognize them, is the appropriate response to these concerns.
2. Rebuttable Presumption
Because payment alone is not enough, uniform federal legislation is a
mandatory component as well. If uniformity is the default rule in this field
of law, then surrogates would be forced to uphold the contracts they
voluntarily make, while still leaving room for surrogates refusing to give
up custody under a rebuttable presumption that the best interest of the child
is to grant custody to the contractually intended parent(s). In other words,
intended parents would automatically be granted custody under a
traditional surrogacy-for-pay contract unless the surrogate rebutted this
135. See Epstein, supra note 47, at 2319.
136. See also Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revising the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 281 (2006) ("Rather, in
traditional surrogacy arrangements, the 'surrogate' is regarded as the mother, requiring
adoption proceedings to transfer parental rights to those intending to rear the child, even in
California."); cf Bill E. Davidoff, Frozen Embryos: A Need For Thawing in the Legislative
Process, 47 SMU L. REV. 131, 153 (1993) (arguing for legislative guidelines for embryo
agreements in IVF treatments because, among other reasons, there is a potential for
adhesion contracts because "patients encounter IVF programs at a time when they are
experiencing a tremendous amount of psychological stress and emotional trauma caused by
infertility"). This extra step of adopting the child allows the surrogate to have even more
power over the intended parents.
137. The court in In re Baby M expressed concern over "taking advantage of a woman's
circumstances (the unwanted pregnancy or the need for money) in order to take away her
child[.]" 537 A.2d at 1249.
138. See John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 637-45 (1994)
(arguing that the issue of exploitation of women in surrogacy contracts is a myth because
women freely choose to engage in these contractual relationships).
139. See Munyon, supra note 12.
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presumption with a claim of fraud, duress, coercion, or best interest of the
child. 140 This would satisfy the intended parents' need for reliable family
structures while also discouraging surrogates who are unwilling to contract
away their parental rights from the outset.
3. Specific Elements Required
Some regulators have taken steps in the right direction by choosing
specific requirements that both surrogates and intended parents must meet
before surrogacy contracts will be allowed.141 While many of the current
regulations are too discriminatory,142 they can be altered to ensure
legitimate protection of all parties involved.
a. Health Requirements
First, surrogates should be required to prove mental and physical
health. Those with genetic disorders or contagious diseases should be
disqualified from participation in traditional surrogacy.14 3  Surrogates
would be required to submit to a thorough health screening prior to
insemination. The mental health of the surrogate is also an important
consideration, especially since the surrogate will be required to separate
from the child after birth, which may cause emotional conflicts. This
requirement can be accomplished with a simple mental health screening or
therapy session before each surrogacy, which clears the surrogate for
insemination. Furthermore, the intended parents should also be required to
prove that their health is in such a condition that would allow them to care
for a newborn child without risk to the child.14 4
There should be absolutely no requirement for infertility of the
intended parents. As stated earlier, infertility requirements limit this
reproductive technology to an inappropriately small class of people. Those
who are not infertile, but have other motivations for wanting to engage in
traditional surrogacy, should not be unjustly excluded.
b. Financing Requirements
The surrogate should be required to prove that she is not impoverished
at the time of contracting. This can be accomplished through tax records or
140. For more on the best interest standard, see Blackburn, supra note 25, at 363-64. See
also Carla Spivak, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP.
L. 97, 106-07 (2010).
141. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
142. Id.
143. While it is unclear where to draw the line for genetic disorders in a society where
advanced screening is possible, at the very least, women with genetic traits that have a
strong inheritable component should be excluded.
144. A useful comparison may be to adoption standards. See The Adoption Home Study,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2010), http://www.childwelfare.
gov/pubs/f homstu.cfm (stating serious health problems of potential adoptive parents may
prevent adoption from being approved).
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other proof of financing. Although this is a controversial requirement
because it would eliminate poor women from making money as surrogates,
the requirement is necessary to ensure the surrogate is not unjustly induced
into entering the contract. Furthermore, this requirement helps ensure the
surrogate will have adequate nutrition during her pregnancy, thus helping
to ensure a healthy child at birth.
The intended parents should also be required to show financial
stability. First, they must be financially secure enough to pay the surrogacy
fee. But also, adequate finances help ensure the child will be raised in a
financially stable environment. This is not to suggest that those with less
than perfect credit or those who are not "rich" should be excluded. Rather,
the intended parents must have a moderate income and adequate assurances
that the income will be available in the future. 145
c. Age Requirements
Surrogates should be within the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five
years old, which can be proven with birth record documents. While the
age of majority in most states is eighteen, requiring surrogates to be at least
twenty-five accomplishes several goals. First, while eighteen is the age at
which most people graduate high school, seven years later at age twenty-
five, most women will have had a job, higher education, or started families
of their own. These additional life experiences will allow the surrogate to
recognize the gravity of the choice she is making by contractually agreeing
to a surrogacy relationship. Age thirty-five should be the cut-off because
this is the age at which medical professionals begin to classify pregnancies
as being higher risk.14 6
d. Frequency Limitations
Finally, surrogates should be strictly limited in the number of
surrogacy births they can have in their lifetime. The age requirement
discussed above would already restrict this quite substantially, but
surrogates should be further limited to a maximum of three independent
surrogate pregnancies. This limitation is based on pregnancies, and not the
number of children born, because surrogates who are capable of carrying
multiples to term should neither be penalized nor substantially rewarded.
This three-pregnancy limitation allows a surrogate to engage in multiple
contracts during her lifetime without invoking a concern that she is a
surrogate mother by trade. Indeed, this limitation makes surrogacy less
145. This is not unreasonable, nor would it be surprising. In the context of adoption, the
United States and foreign nations often have income requirements to qualify for adoption.
See id. (stating that you need to maintain responsible finances in order to adopt).
146. See Pregnancy After 35, MARCH OF DIMES, http://www.marchofdimes.com/
pregnancy/tryingafter35.html (last updated May 2009) (citing risk of birth defects,
miscarriage, and pregnancy complications increase after age thirty-five).
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likely to be a financially motivated venture because a surrogate could not
support herself indefinitely on the limited fees permitted. 147
The presence of these requirements placed on the parties before they
ever enter into a contract dramatically limits the scope of who may
participate in surrogacy. The limitations create protections for parties on
both sides, helping to ensure stability and favorable outcomes. These
limitations are also dramatically less discriminatory to single, gay, and
lesbian parents by not eliminating them from the outset. Finally, these
limitations would alleviate any concerns that surrogacy will become a
"baby-selling" tool, since surrogacy would not be financially significant to
the parties because the frequency limitations would prevent surrogates from
receiving a stable income from the process.
B. REGULATION OF PAYMENT
Arguably, the most important element of the surrogacy-for-pay
contract would be placing a cap on the amount of payments allowed, which
would also be relatively simple to establish. First the fee cannot be so high
as to induce any surrogates to participate solely for the money. That means
the fee cannot be high enough to qualify as a living wage without an
alternative source of income.148 At the same time, however, it cannot be so
low as to be unjust to the surrogate for her services and revocation of legal
parenthood rights.
For these reasons, traditional surrogates should be paid for all
reasonable medical expenses directly relating to the pregnancyl49 as well as
an additional surrogacy fee. This fee should be limited to a standard
$10,000 per pregnancy, with an added allowance of $2,000 for each
additional child carried to term in the same pregnancy. This fee would be a
standardized ceiling, above which parties cannot legally contract.
However, if parties consensually agree to a lower fee, it would be legally
permissible. Under this standard, those who wish to be traditional
surrogates out of pure altruism would be free to do so. While this fee may
sound exorbitant, it is actually a dramatic decrease from the fees many
current surrogates already receive for their services.150
147. See discussion of fee regulation infra Part V.B.
148. See 2011 Federal Poverty Level, FOUNDATION FOR HEALTH COVERAGE EDUCATION,
http://www.coverageforall.org/pdf/FHCEFedPovertyLevel.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2012)
(citing the poverty level income in the contiguous United States in 2011 as anything below
$10,890 yearly income).
149. This does not include medical expenses which crop up later in life that may have
been attributed to by the pregnancy. Instead, I am referring to the direct expenses of
doctors' appointments, ultrasounds, prenatal vitamins, and other medical costs incurred
during the pregnancy for the purpose of the pregnancy.
150. See Classifieds, SURROGACY.COM, http://www.surrogacy.com/cgi-bin/classifieds/
classifieds.cgi?db=seek ts&website=&language=&session key- (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
When the surrogates get to name their own price, the sky is the limit. In the classified
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VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, banning traditional surrogacy for-payment does not
serve a legitimate state interest. Instead, it creates discriminatory and
undesirable results which force individuals to find a roundabout way to
avoid legal prohibition. Oftentimes, parties to these contracts enter into
them out of desperation. Individuals in this situation should not be faced
with a confusing legal regime, void of uniform regulation. Indeed, under
current law, parties may enter into agreements they think are binding, only
to find out courts and legislators view these contracts as unenforceable and
immoral. This outmoded view of traditional surrogacy as "baby selling"
needs to stop. Instead, considering the motivations of the parties to the
contracts, courts and legislators should recognize that traditional surrogacy
for-payment is not inherently evil.'5 '
The payment of a reasonable fee for surrogacy services should be
uniformly allowed for several reasons. First, it compensates surrogates for
the time and commitment put into the pregnancy. Second, it allows
intended parents to have a modicum of assurance that the surrogate will be
legally bound to the agreed upon outcome. Finally, reasonable payment
would not significantly undermine the preferred altruistic intentions of the
surrogate.
Courts and legislators need to start examining the bigger picture,
instead of focusing on outdated assumptions. With this in mind, traditional
surrogacy should not be treated as adoption, but as its own unique entity,
deserving of equal considerations and protections at the federal level.
Indeed, traditional surrogacy for-payment needs to be uniformly recognized
and regulated for the benefit of the surrogate, the intended parents, and the
child.
section of one surrogacy website, the requested fees range from $20,000 to $50,000,
depending upon the surrogate.
151. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241 (N.J. 1988) (stating "the evils inherent in
baby-bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons").
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